Using original data from client-community assessments, we examine motivations in the Ugandan NGO sector. In general, client-community satisfaction with NGO interventions is high, even though some NGO sta¤ are viewed as unresponsive, underskilled, or self-serving.
Introduction
Over the last two decades there has been a signi…cant increase in the involvement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the development process. This is a response, in part, to the growing frustration and impatience of donors with the perceived failure of governmental development assistance to generate growth and alleviate poverty. It may also re ‡ect the apparent success of some non-governmental development initiatives, such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, during the same period (e.g. Glaeser, Sacerdote & Scheinkman 1996 , Edwards & Hulme 1995 , Farringhton, Bebbington, Wellard & Lewis 1993 . Governments in both developed and developing countries are responding to this situation by fostering partnerships with the NGO sector. But such partnerships can only enhance development if the public interest is better served by funding NGOs rather than governments.
It is reasonable to assume that NGOs have greater autonomy than line ministries. This being the case, the motivations of NGOs and their sta¤ need to be taken into account when designing the laws and systems that regulate the increasing number of NGOs and facilitate closer government-NGO cooperation. Our ideal and stylized view is of NGOs working to redress the welfare imbalance between rich and poor, using resources donated by the former to provide goods and services to the latter. But there are many accounts, some quite spectacular, supporting an alternative view. Consider, for example, the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God, a registered Ugandan NGO which is reported to have killed more than 700 of its, generally quite poor, members or followers in the late 1990's (e.g. Cauvin 2000 , Wangah 2000 . But both bad and good accounts relating to speci…c NGOs can be misleading.
What policymakers need is an evaluation of the motivations and performance of a representative sample of their nations'NGOs.
Case studies and small-sample surveys of NGOs have provided many valuable insights into the role of particular factors in ensuring NGO e¢ ciency, longevity, and success (e.g. Acharya, Aryal, Karmacharya & Meyer 1999 , Belshaw & Coyle 2001 , Cannon 2000 , Jagannathan 2003 , Riddel, De Coninck, Muir, Robinson & White 1995 . However, there have been very few evaluations of entire countries'NGO sectors and those that have been undertaken have tended to be descriptive and qualitative in nature (e.g. Gariyo 1995 , Johnson & Johnson 1990 , Pratt & Sahley 2003 . As a consequence, we know very little about the motivations and performance of either NGOs in general or what we might refer to as a representative NGO.
The objective of this paper is to take a …rst step towards performing a nationally representative evaluation of NGO motivations. Our approach focuses on the levels of satisfaction that a large and nationally representative sample of NGOs generates within its client-communities.
The evaluation presented here is of the Ugandan NGO sector and is based on data collected during 268 structured group interviews involving over 2500 individuals. The resulting sample of evaluations is large enough to support an econometric analysis of Ugandan NGOs'motivations.
Thus, the contribution of this paper is twofold: it presents an innovative methodology for involving client-communities in the evaluation of an entire nation's NGO sector, and it illustrates the value of that methodology through an application to the Ugandan NGO sector.
The methodology su¤ers from several major constraints and resultant shortcomings that are worthy of note. First, at least in its application to Uganda, the methodology could not support an assessment of cost minimization or technical e¢ ciency. The data also do not allow comparisons, along these dimensions, of NGOs and other service providers such as government facilities. This is because the client-community assessments could not be matched with data on quantities of actual physical services provided by NGOs. Such an analysis might be possible if one restricted the research to NGOs specializing in the provision of speci…c, fairly standard, services such as healthcare and children's schooling (e.g. Reinikka & Svensson 2003 , Lindelow, Reinikka & Swensson 2003 . However, the large majority of Ugandan NGOs are neither specialized nor involved in these types of activities. Many focus on awareness raising, advocacy, and training, the outputs of which are extremely di¢ cult if not impossible to quantify. And many assume a holistic approach to helping an often vaguely de…ned target group. Thus, they engage in di¤erent activities in di¤erent locations depending on the needs they perceive and the resources they can access.
Some analysis of cost minimization would be possible if one were able to align clientcommunity assessments with cost data. However, as documented by Barr, Fafchamps & Owens (2003) , Ugandan NGOs do not typically charge for their services and their clients are unaware of the full cost of the services rendered. Cost data collected directly from the NGOs themselves can also be problematic. Despite the fact that Ugandan NGOs tend to be run by well educated and apparently entrepreneurial individuals, few keep detailed …nancial records. In part, this may re ‡ect the general absence or weakness of institutions that hold NGOs accountable. In aggregate the Ugandan NGO sector is primarily funded by international NGOs and bilateral donors that require feedback on how funds are used. However, these funds accrue to only a handful of NGOs.
The majority rely on membership fees and small grants from larger domestic NGOs that have less onerous reporting requirements. Further, even when detailed …nancial records are kept, NGOs rarely document how much they spend in any particular location. Few Ugandan NGOs operate nationwide, many operate in only two or three districts, and most operate in only one (see Figure 1) . However, even the latter of these three groups tends to operate in more than one local community within the district. Finally, even if accurate and su¢ ciently detailed …nancial records were kept, they could generate misleading analytical results. Costs would indeed be subject to severe understatement because many Ugandan NGO inputs are non-monetary; they take the form of volunteer time and complimentary use of facilities and equipment (Fafchamps and Owens 2005) . Imputing values for these inputs is theoretically possible, but in practice, is hindered by the generally sporadic and part-time nature of NGO operations (Barr, Fafchamps & Owens 2003) .
Given these limitations, we restrict our attention to something we can assess, namely the level of satisfaction that NGOs generate among their clients, and we investigate whether NGOs geographically allocate their e¤orts and resources so as to redress existing imbalances in welfare between communities. Adressing a similar issue, Fruttero and Gauri (2005) …nd that community needs have little in ‡uence on where Bangladeshi NGOs'locate new interventions. Here we focus on client community satisfaction with NGO interventions, and on how intervention quality varies across communities depending on community characteristics. Taking a utilitarian welfare function as our benchmark, we …nd evidence that Ugandan NGOs endeavour to redress the balance between rich and poor communities. We also …nd that, NGOs are less inclined to maintain a permanent presence in poorer client-communities and that this signi…cantly a¤ects the satisfaction of such communities. The level of community involvement in NGO decision making also a¤ects community satisfaction, with more involved communities being more satis…ed. Some NGO sta¤ and representatives are perceived as unresponsive, less than good at what they do, and self-rather than community-serving, and these perceptions are negatively associated with client-community satisfaction. Finally, we …nd evidence that NGOs too often operate in the same location, resulting in duplication of e¤ort.
The paper has six sections. Section 2 describes our conceptual framework and empirical strategy. In Section 3 we describe the data collection approach and sampling methodology.
In Section 4 we describe how the key variables in our dataset is generated during the clientcommunity evaluation meetings and present descriptive statistics. The econometric analysis is presented in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
Conceptual framework
We wish to test whether NGOs geographically allocate their funding so as to redress existing welfare imbalances among communities. To do this, we construct a …rst best benchmark against which we can compare the performance of NGOs. Consider an ideal NGOs behaving like a benevolent social planner. The NGO has …nancial resources M for the provision of local public goods that it must allocate among various communities j 2 N; where N is the total number of communities to be served. For the moment, assume that the communities are homogeneous so that all members have the same preferences and the same initial endowments of resources.
We revisit this assumption later. Communities have preferences among various public goods G k indexed by k 2 K where, for simplicity, we have standardized public goods so that all prices equal 1. Preferences can be represented as utility function U j (G 1 ; :::G K ). 1 Suppose that a …nancial amount M j is allocated by the NGO to public good projects in community j. If the NGO behaves optimally, it should allocate M j among competing public goods so as to maximize the following:
The solution to this maximization has the form V j (M j ). Now consider the allocation of resources among communities. If the NGO behaves like a utilitarian social planner, it should maximize aggregate welfare:
To keep things manageable, we assume that the provision of public goods does not a¤ect relative prices, so that local price speci…city can be subsumed in community-speci…c preferences. which leads to …rst order conditions of the form:
where is the Lagrange multiplier on the feasibility constraint
should be allocated across communities so as to equalize the marginal utility from an additional dollar of public good expenditure. If all communities have the same utility function, this means providing the same level of support to all communities.
If communities di¤er, however, resource allocation need not be equal. To illustrate this, suppose that:
where Y j represents the initial resource endowment of the community j. Further suppose that V 0 > 0 and V 00 0. In this case, the optimal resource allocation is one that compensates for initial di¤erences in endowments: less well endowed communities receive more. In this case, if we were to ask communities to evaluate the satisfaction provided by the NGO, we would expect it to decrease with Y j : better o¤ communities would receive less and consequently would have a lower judgement of the usefulness of the NGO. 2
The above model can be generalized further by allowing the cost of providing public goods to vary across communities. This might be the case if some communities are more remote:
delivering a public good to a more remote village is more costly because transportation required 2 This model can be generalized by letting NGO services and private consumption be imperfect substitutes. If NGO services are normal goods, the rich wish to consume more of them than the poor. Consequently, the marginal utility of NGO services is higher among the rich (e.g. Dasgupta & Kanbur 2001 , Dasgupta & Kanbur 2003 . Put di¤erently, prosperous communities derive at the margin more satisfaction from NGO services than the poor. This e¤ect works in the opposite direction from the community reallocation e¤ect outlined above and would thus bias the predicted negative relationship between community prosperity and NGO satisfaction towards zero. So, if we do …nd evidence of a negative relationship, it can be interpreted as evidence of an e¤ort to favor poor communities. greater resources. (Sharma and Zeller 1999) have indeed shown that, in the case of Bangladesh, NGOs tend to locate their micro-credit interventions in relatively accessible pockets of poverty rather than focusing on hard-to-reach communities. To capture this idea in a simple way, let (d) be 1 minus the proportion of the funds that are lost due to transport costs. Put di¤erently, if M j is spent on community j, after deduction of transport costs only M j worth of local public goods is produced. We have @ @d < 0: more remote communities have a lower 'bang for the buck' e¤ect. The NGO's optimization problem now is:
which yields …rst order conditions of the form:
To see how remoteness a¤ects the allocation decision, assume that is constant and totally di¤erentiate the above to see how M j respond to changes in :
From this we see that, if V 00 < 0, the NGO allocates more resources to communities with a higher , i.e., to less remote communities. The rationale is that remote communities are costly to serve and more good can be done with limited dollars by focussing on less remote communities. Thus, we would expect more remote communities to receive less and thus to be less satis…ed with NGOs.
The above ideas form the basis of our empirical strategy. Let V j be a measurement of community satisfaction about an NGO intervention and let Y j and j denote the initial resource endowment of the community j and its remoteness. How these measurements are obtained is discussed in the next section. The model presented above suggests that better endowed and more remote communities are less satis…ed with the NGO intervention. To test the model, we might therefore estimate a regression of the form:
and test whether 1 < 0 and 2 < 0.
The model can be further generalized to allow for heterogeneity among community members.
Presumably, not all individuals within a community have the same preferences regarding public goods fG k g. If we seek to ascertain the community's satisfaction with the NGO by interviewing a sample of the population, responses may di¤er depending on how well the preferences of the people interviewed are matched by the services being provided by the NGO. We might expect di¤erent people-types to have varying levels of in ‡uence over the NGOs activities, for example. To allow for this possibility, we add a vector of Z j variables that measure the main characteristics of the responding client-community groups to the regression equation (2.1). The estimated model then is:
2) constitutes what, for reasons that will soon be apparent, we call the reduced form model.
Above, we assume that community satisfaction depends only on outcomes, not on process.
Yet many practitioners in the …eld insist that the way outcomes are reached a¤ects the satis-faction people derive from NGO (and other) interventions. As a result, many NGOs advocate a participatory approach and seek to involve their client-communities in their activities. In addition to its direct e¤ect on utility, client involvement may improve allocative e¢ ciency by ensuring a better match between community needs and NGO interventions.
In general, a participatory approach requires greater contact between NGO sta¤ and client communities. This is likely impact more heavily on costs when client communities are more remote. Hence, one would expect NGOs to assume a less participatory approach in more remote communities.
It is immediately clear from the above reasoning that if participation by clients raises satisfaction -even without a¤ecting outcomes -and if remoteness and prosperity have e¤ects on participation that are similar to their e¤ect on outcomes, regressing satisfaction on remoteness and prosperity cannot distinguish between their direct and process e¤ects. For this reason, we reestimate the model with additional controls P j for client participation:
If 4 > 0, this can be construed as evidence that participation raises satisfaction either directly or by improving the allocative e¢ ciency of the NGO intervention. We also examine whether participation variables P j vary signi…cantly with remoteness and prosperity, as suggested above.
Indeed if participation has a distinct e¤ect on satisfaction, it is important to identify which factors a¤ect participation.
Data collection methodology
Having presented our conceptual framework and empirical strategy, we now describe how the client-community evaluation of a representative sample of Ugandan NGOs can be executed.
In summary, our methodology involves randomly selecting a large sample of Ugandan NGOs, identifying one community served by each of these NGOs, and involving members of each of these communities in an evaluation of the NGO.
The selection of client-communities involves three steps. First, we determine the geographical coverage of the survey. The capital city, Kampala, is included given that many NGOs use Kampala as a base while operating throughout the country. In addition to Kampala, we focus shown by Barr, Fafchamps & Owens (2003) , many Kampala NGOs are not actually in operation while most of those registered in the district are. 4 The composition of the eventual NGO sample 3 451 NGOs that ultimately appeared on our list represent only 25 percent of those registered. In the other districts the corresponding proportion was 41 percent. In some cases we think these …gures re ‡ect the accuracy of the information on the location of the NGO headquarters contained in the registers. However, we also suspect that there are many 'ghosts', i.e., NGOs that have ceased to exist, while remaining in the registers. There is no formal procedure in place for removing NGOs from the register when they are no longer operating or fail to re-register at the prescribed time. 4 When sampled NGOs could not be contacted they were usually replaced by another randomly selected NGO from the list relating to the corresponding district. 82 such replacements were made. In 12 cases, enumerators in remote areas were forced by circumstance to make replacements by whatever means they could. Ultimately 295 by district is presented in Table 1 .
The third step is the selection of the client-communities. Each sampled NGO is asked to list up to 6 parishes in which it is active. One of these 6 parishes is then selected at random for a client-community evaluation. 5 In total, 268 client-community evaluations were undertaken.
The resulting distribution of client-community evaluations across the 15 districts is presented in the last column of Table 1 . When comparing these numbers with the corresponding numbers of NGOs it is important to bear in mind that some of the Kampala-based NGOs are evaluated in the rural districts. 66 evaluation meetings are conducted in Kampala and 202 across the other 14 districts.
Once we have selected the parishes to be involved in the client-community evaluation, the enumerators contact the parish chairman and make arrangements for a meeting. The chairman is asked to invite between six and ten community members to the meeting. The enumerators requests that men and women and people of all ages be represented but otherwise leaves the selection up to the chairman. This approach is not ideal; it probably biases our sample of respondents towards those who are politically closest to the chairmen and those who tend to get involved in group activities and interactions with outsiders. However, it is necessary, given the magnitude of our endeavour and the need to conserve time where possible. Our aim, by always involving the parish chairman, is to ensure that any bias thus generated is consistent across NGOs were identi…ed and contacted.
5 A slightly more involved procedure is followed for Kampala-based NGOs because a considerable proportion of them operate in other districts and many are based in Kampala but do not serve communities there. Consequently, for Kampala-based NGOs, we …rst ascertain in which districts they operate. To …nd out whether the NGO operates in Kampala, it is asked to list the Kampala parishes -if any -within which they were active. This establishes whether the NGO operates in Kampala. Outside Kampala, enumerators in each of the 14 other districts draw a list all Kampala-based NGOs with a branch o¢ ce in their district. One district is then randomly selected from all the districts in which the NGO operates.
Within districts, the selection of a parish to be the client-community for the evaluation exercise proceeds in much the same way as before. If the selected district of operation of the NGO is Kampala, one parish is randomly selected among those listed by the NGO. If the selected district is one of the other 14 districts included in the study, the NGO's branch o¢ ce in that district is asked to list up to 6 parishes in which the NGO is active. One of these parishes is then randomly selected. communities and, therefore, not a major hindrance in comparative analysis. The NGOs are never involved in the selection of the client-communities or any other aspect of the evaluation process.
To ensure that the data provided by each of the client-communities involved in the evaluation is comparable, structured group interviews are conducted in each of the client-communities following a well-de…ned interview protocol. The protocol aims at gathering information that quanti…es client-communities' satisfaction with the performance of the NGO they have been selected to evaluate, how accessible the NGO is to the community, how participatory the NGOs' decision making practices are, and the client-communities' perceptions about the quality and motivations of the NGOs'sta¤ and representatives. Each of these measures is elicited through an activity designed to be entertaining and easily understandable. Various indicators of community prosperity and isolation and the characteristics of the client-community respondent groups are also collected.
Descriptive analysis
The structured group interviews yield several measures of the client-communities' satisfaction with the NGOs they are evaluating. One of these is a measure of the communities'willingness to pay for the continued existence of the NGOs. To elicit this measure, we ask the client-community group to imagine that they …nd out that the NGO is going to stop doing its work in Uganda, that a large sum of money is needed to make it possible for the NGO to carry on doing its work, and that their parish has been asked to help …nd this money. Then, they are asked to imagine that the government gives their parish a grant and they are the committee that has to decide what to do with the grant. The government has said that they can share all, some, or none of the grant equally among the households in the parish and can contribute all, some, or none of the grant to the NGO to help keep it working. The representatives are given a pile of beans representing the grant and asked to separate it into two piles, one representing the money that they wish to be shared among the households and one representing the money that they wish to help keep the NGO working. The proportion of the beans allocated to the NGOs is taken as an indicator of their willingness to pay, conditional on the availability of funds, for the continuance of the NGOs'activities. Table 2 ).
In addition to this willingness to pay measure, we ask the client-communities to evaluate the abilities and motivations of the sta¤ and representatives of the NGOs. To facilitate this, we ask the community groups to indicate the extent to which they agree (on a …ve point scale) with several statements. Here, we focus on three statements: 'The NGO is always quick to respond when inhabitants of this parish or the parish as a whole ask for help'; 'The NGO representatives are good at what they do'; and 'The NGO exists to serve the purposes of its own sta¤ rather than to help us'. Figure 3 presents the frequency distribution across the …ve point scale of agreement relating to each of these statements. The …rst two statements are positive, while the third is negative. We reverse the horizontal axis of the graph for the third statement so that the right hand sides of all the graphs correspond to a positive evaluation. In general the graphs suggest that the client-communities think highly of the NGOs'sta¤ and representatives. Nearly 40 percent strongly agree that 'the NGO is always quick to respond when the inhabitants of this parish or the parish as a whole ask for help'. Over 50 percent strongly agree that 'the NGO representatives are good at what they do'. And over 60 percent strongly disagree with the statement that 'the NGO exists to serve the purposes of its own sta¤ rather than to help the community'. However, some negative perceptions are also evident. Nearly 10 percent strongly disagree with the statement about responsiveness to the needs of the community and a similar proportion strongly agree that the NGO sta¤ are self-serving.
When estimating the models derived in section 2, we use the willingness to pay measure of community satisfaction as our dependent variable because it is this measure that explicitly captures the value of the NGO to the evaluating community, given the latter's geographical and material situation. In contrast, the statement-based evaluation measures are designed to provide the communities with an opportunity to be more objective, i.e., to evaluate certain aspects of the NGO without focusing on the value of those aspects to themselves. However, before discarding the statement-based measures, it is interesting to look at how they relate to willingness to pay (see Table 3 ). The top left hand panel of the table reports pairwise correlation coe¢ cients. The willingness to pay, 'quick to respond', and 'good at what they do' measures are all highly, positively correlated with one another, while the 'self-serving'measure is highly, negatively correlated with each of the others. The top right hand panel of the table presents an OLS regression of the willingness to pay measure on the three statement-based variables. This model should be treated with extreme caution. In particular, it should not be used to support any causal statements as the estimated coe¢ cients are likely to be subject to reporting bias.
However, it is useful to note that the associations between the willingness to pay and two of the statement-based measures are signi…cant in the regression despite the previously identi…ed multicollinearity.
The lower panel of the table contains the results of an iterated principal factor analysis.
The eigenvalue corresponding to the …rst factor represents a large proportion of the sum of all the positive eigenvalues. This suggests that, to a considerable degree, willingness to pay and the three statement-based measures are all capturing a single underlying variable. Further, the loadings associated with this factor suggest that it might reasonably be referred to as satisfaction; it is positively related to the willingness to pay, 'quick to respond', and 'good at what they do' measures and negatively related to the 'self-serving'measure. Finally the measures of variable uniqueness reported in the bottom right hand corner of the table indicate that the derived factors tend to capture a relatively small proportion of the variance in willingness to pay measure; the willingness to pay measure is, somehow, more distinct, possibly because it is more subjective than the others.
To assess the extent to which NGO sta¤ adopt a participatory approach, each clientcommunity is asked whether the NGO either involves them in decisions about what activities are to be undertaken or asks them for feedback. Table 2 presents the answers to these questions.
Respectively, 55 and 57 percent of the client-communities state that they are involved in de…n-ing the activities undertaken by the NGO and in providing feedback. In addition, we elicited one additional indicator of the NGOs commitment to a participatory approach. This indicator simply captures whether the NGO maintains a permanent presence in the community. Table 2 indicates that 62 percent of the evaluated NGOs maintain such a presence. The reader may be surprised to …nd that such a large number of NGO have a permanent presence in the parishes of their evaluation client-communities. This …nding, however, is largely a re ‡ection of the way in which the client-communities are selected for inclusion in the study.
To facilitate the quanti…cation of community remoteness, we ask client-community respondent groups to estimate how far in kilometers their community is from three key institutions: the district headquarter, the local council (LC3) o¢ ce, and the nearest hospital. We also ask how far they are from the nearest tarred road. The degree of remoteness of the sampled communities varies considerably across the sample (see Table 3 ). The distance to district headquarters ranges from under half a kilometer to 64 kilometers. The average is 10 kilometers with, as expected, sampled communities in Kampala district being nearer. The distance to the nearest hospital varies between a few hundred meters and over 100 kilometers, with an average of 8 kilometers -less in Kampala. Local council (level 3) o¢ ces are between zero and 23 kilometers away, with a mean distance of 3 kilometers. Finally, the nearest tarred road is between zero and 400 kilometers away, the average distance being 10 kilometers.
The prosperity of the communities is assessed by asking respondent groups to estimate the prevalence of particular housing characteristics, ownership of certain consumer durables, paid employment, and access rights to cultivatable land within their communities. For each characteristic, they do this by dividing a pile of beans representing all the households in the community into those with and those without the characteristic. There is considerable variation across the sample with respect to indicators of prosperity. On average, client-community groups estimate that 75 percent of the households in their communities have an iron roof (see Table 3 ), 48 percent have a cement ‡oor in their home, 22 percent own a TV, 73 percent own a radio, 37 percent own a bicycle, and 8 percent own a car. On average, 18 percent of client-community households have at least one member in paid employment, and 60 percent have no access to land upon which to grow food. All of these proportions vary widely, typically between zero and 100 percent of households, across the sample. As expected, the incidence of iron roofs, cement ‡oors, and landlessness is far greater in Kampala.
Data relating to the characteristics of the client-community respondent groups is collected during brief, one-to-one interviews with each respondent group member conducted after the evaluations are complete. In the one-to-one interviews, each respondent is asked about his or her age, education, religion, and whether he/she is a member, sta¤, or client of the evaluated NGO. Table 4 presents the characteristics of the 2566 individuals who participated in the evaluations and shows how they are distributed across the client-community respondent groups. The average age of the participants is 38 years, although across groups the average age varies between 18 and 65. Women represent 43 percent of the participants in the evaluation. Some groups are entirely male and others entirely female, although the majority of groups are mixed. Christians make up the large majority of participants with 36 percent being protestant, 32 percent Catholic, and 7 percent Pentecostal. Muslims make up 20 percent of the participants. Levels of education among the participants are high by Ugandan standards, with considerable variation in educational attainment across the groups. Over the entire population of respondents, 21 percent have some tertiary education; 41 percent have primary and some secondary education; 32 percent have primary education only; and 6 percent have no education at all. Just over 2 percent of the client-community respondents turn out to be sta¤ members of the NGOs they are asked to evaluate and at least one NGO sta¤ member is present in 14 percent of the evaluation meetings.
A further 39 percent of the participants are either members or clients of the NGOs they are asked to evaluate, either as members or clients and at least one such person is present in 75 percent of the evaluation meetings. This is not surprising since, as Barr, Fafchamps & Owens (2004) have shown, NGO membership -and the payment of a small membership fee -are often preconditions for becoming an NGO client, and our survey focuses on client communities.
Econometric analysis

Reduced form
We now turn to the econometric analysis of willingness to pay as a measure of community satisfaction. We begin with regression model (2.2). Our objective here is to assess whether NGOs allocate funds so as to reduce geographical imbalances in welfare. If they do so, we expect more prosperous communities, i.e., those with greater resource endowments to be less satis…ed with NGOs. We also recognize that remoteness raises the cost of service delivery -and thus reduces the 'bang-for-the-buck' generated by service provision. Consequently, we expect more remote communities to be less satis…ed with NGOs.
Given the relatively small number of observations, we choose to proxy remoteness with a single variable, the value of which is determined by applying principle factor analysis to the four distance variables described above. 6 We proxy for the initial resource endowments of the client communities with three variables. The …rst, which captures durable asset holdings, is determined by applying principal factor analysis to the …rst six endowment indicators listed in Table 4 . 7 The proportion of households with at least one member in paid employment and the proportion of landless are entered as separate independent variables. The landless are resource poor so, if
NGOs behave in accordance with our model, communities with more landless households will be more satis…ed with NGO services. In Uganda, paid employment is concentrated at either end of the income spectrum: waged and salaried employees in formal jobs tend to earn more than the average, while agricultural labourers earn signi…cantly less. We expect the …rst group to dominate in cities and the second to dominate in rural areas. Thus, if NGOs behave in accordance with our model, rural communities with more households in paid employment will be poorer and so more satis…ed with NGOs, while urban communities with more households in paid employment will be richer and hence less satis…ed with NGOs. 6 Iterated principle factor analysis was used and the …rst principle factor retrieved as our single proxy for remoteness. This factor has an eigenvalue that corresponds to 68 percent of the sum of all the positive eigenvalues. The scoring coe¢ cients are 0.18100 for the distance to district headquarters, 0.49787 for the distance to nearest hospital, 0.15969 for the distance to local council (LC3) o¢ ces, and 0.35237 for the distance to nearest tarred road.
7 Iterated principal factor analysis was used and the …rst principal factor retrieved as our single proxy for asset holdings. This factor has an eigenvalue that corresponds to 69 percent of the sum of all the positive eigenvalues. The scoring coe¢ cients are 0.21763 for the proportion of households with iron roofs, 0.35498 for the proportion with cement ‡oors, 0.18699 for the proportion with televisions, 0.21571 for the proportion with radios, 0.26194 for the proportion with cars, and -0.01656 for the proportion with bicycles. The negative coe¢ cient on bicycles may re ‡ect the presence of a more luxurious substitute, cars, in the question set.
By providing the client-community groups with hypothetical grants rather than exploring their willingness to pay for the continued existence of the NGO out of their own pocket, we hope to avoid the problem of variable ability to pay. However, if …nancial markets are imperfect and the client-community groups are variably credit constrained, this could a¤ect their bean allocation decision. Further, omitted variable bias would arise if, as is likely, the prosperity indicator is correlated with credit constraints. To minimize this bias, we include a proxy for the extent to which the client-community is credit constrained. This proxy is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if, during the structured group interview, client-community respondents either listed improved access to credit as one of their community's priority needs during a free listing exercise or agreed that it was a priority need when asked explicitly.
We include a number of characteristics of interview respondents to control for various possible reporting biases and heterogeneities in preferences across respondent types. For obvious reasons, we expect NGO sta¤ and, possibly, members as well to be more interested in the continued functioning of the NGO. To the extent that bargaining power within the community a¤ects the choice of public service provided by the NGO, we expect that the needs of women are less well served by the NGO and therefore we expect female respondents to be less satis…ed with the NGO. We also include a Kampala dummy to control for possible di¤erences in preferences between urban and rural populations. 8 The regression results are presented in Table 5 . The estimator is a two-limit tobit, with upper and lower limits on the proportion of the hypothetical grant allocated to the NGOs at zero (8 observations in the full sample) and one (62 observations in the full sample). Three regressions are presented. The …rst regression includes the full sample of client-communities, the second is for the rural client-communities only and the third is for the Kampala-based clientcommunities. While the regressions for the full sample and the rural sub-sample are signi…cant (see p-values in last row of table), the model (2.2) appears to have no explanatory power in Kampala. This may be because remoteness is less of an issue in the capital city where all communities can be accessed with relative ease and residents in one neighborhood of the city can probably access service providers located in other neighborhoods, so that the prosperity of any particular neighborhood is less important in determining the geographical distribution of NGO activity. This being the case, we focus our discussion to the …rst two regressions.
Across both the full sample and the sub-sample of rural communities satisfaction declines as remoteness and communities'holdings of durable assets increase. These …ndings accord with the utilitarian model and are consistent with NGOs endeavouring to redress the balance between rich and poor. The estimated coe¢ cients on employment also accord with the model -positive in rural areas and negative (though not signi…cant) in Kampala. Landlessness has the wrong sign but is not signi…cant. The coe¢ cient on the credit constrained dummy variable is negative and signi…cant for the full sample and the rural sub-sample, indicating that the hypothetical grant was not su¢ cient to control for communities di¤ering abilities to pay. Both women and younger respondents appear less satis…ed with NGOs suggesting that their needs are being less well served than those of men and older community members. However, all the other respondent characteristic variables, including the proportion of sta¤ and members and clients present, are insigni…cant. 9
Participation
We now look at whether NGOs are more likely to adopt a participatory approach when working in less remote and more prosperous communities and whether participation a¤ects clientcommunity satisfaction. We focus on two aspects of participation, one relating to how involved the community is in NGO decision-making and the other relating to whether the NGO chooses to have a permanent presence in the communities it aims to serve. We construct an 'involvement score', which equals zero if the evaluated NGO involves the community in neither ex ante decision-making nor ex post project evaluation, one if it does one or the other, and two if it does both. The mean involvement score for the full sample of client-community evaluations is 1.12, although this …gure conceals the fact that more than 80 percent of the sample have a score of either zero or 2. An ordered probit analysis taking this involvement score as the dependent variable and remoteness, the three measures of community prosperity, and the Kampala dummy as independent variables is presented in Table 8 . The probits fail to explain any of the variation in the score across either the full sample or the rural sub-sample. However, in Kampala we see that involvement declines as remoteness increases. Permanent presence by the NGO in the community is proxied by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the NGO has an o¢ ce or some sort of permanent structure within the parish and zero otherwise. A probit analysis taking this dummy as the dependent variable (see Table 9 ) indicates that, across both the full sample and the rural sample, NGOs are less likely to maintain a permanent presence in more remote and less prosperous communities.
As NGOs are less present in poor isolated communities, it is pertinent to ask whether it is this alone that is driving the previously identi…ed relationships between satisfaction and remoteness and prosperity. Thus, we estimate equation (2.3), which models community satisfaction as a function of their own remoteness and prosperity while controlling for the extent to which the NGO adopts participatory practices. Table 9 presents the results of introducing the involvement score and the permanent presence dummy variable into the analysis of community satisfaction. The inclusion of these variables improves the signi…cance of the regressions, although the model still fails to explain any of the variation in community willingness to pay across the Kampala sample. Across the full and rural samples, both greater community involvement and permanent NGO presence is associated with higher client-community satisfaction. Controlling for participation (involvement and permanent presence) marginally reduces the coe¢ cient on the remoteness variable, while leaving all other aspects of the model essentially unchanged. This suggests that remoteness may be a¤ecting client-community satisfaction with NGOs in part because NGOs tend to maintain a permanent presence only in less remote, more prosperous communities and in part for other reasons, possibly relating to the costs associated with working in more remote areas.
While compelling, we need to be cautious when drawing conclusions about the value of a participatory approach from this analysis. This is because these results could be driven by response bias. Whether an NGO maintains a permanent presence in a community is a matter of current fact. However, to answer our questions about community involvement in NGO decision making, the client-community representatives needed to recall and appropriately characterize past events. If community representatives are more likely to recall NGO endeavours to get them involved when the NGO's interventions turned out to be of value to them, this would bias the coe¢ cient on the involvement score towards positive signi…cance regardless of whether involvement leads to heightened satisfaction or not.
For 160 out of our full sample of 211 community evaluations, we have some data collected directly from the evaluated NGOs. Included among these data are indicators of whether the NGO conducts participatory workshops, whether they involve their client communities in ex post project evaluations, and whether the NGO is domestic or international, a distinction which might a¤ect not only the tendency of the NGO to adopt a participatory approach but also the NGO sta¤s'understanding of what it means to apply a participatory approach. We would expect each of these NGO-reported, dichotomous variables to be correlated with the clientcommunities' reports of involvement in NGO decision-making without being a¤ected by the reporting bias described in the preceding paragraph. Thus, we can use them to instrument for the community-reported measure of involvement in the Tobit analysis and thereby control for any reporting bias.
The …rst column in Table 10 signi…cance of the three instrumental variables is better than …ve percent, although their partial R-squared is only 0.07 indicating that they are rather poor instruments. This notwithstanding, they are su¢ cient to maintain the signi…cance of community-reported involvement in the second stage regression (see third column). 10 The two-stage procedure also yields a test for the endogeneity of the community-reported involvement variable. The test statistic is the signi…cance of the …rst-stage residuals in the second-stage regression. Since this statistic is insigni…cant, the null hypothesis that community-reported involvement measure does not su¤er from endogeneity is accepted. Taken together, these results indicate that the signi…cance of the positive coe¢ cient on the involvement variable in the one-stage Tobit analysis is not due to response bias. Our results support the claim that participation raises client-community satisfaction.
Geographical clustering of NGOs
So far we have proceeded under the simplifying assumption that there can be only one NGO operating in each location or community. In this section, we explore the verisimilitude of this assumption and investigate another aspect of the allocative e¢ ciency of the Ugandan NGO sector.
We have seen that Ugandan NGOs in general adopt a holistic approach towards meeting all the needs of the communities they serve. It follows that if NGOs allocate their activities optimally across locations, there should be no duplication: if one NGO is already providing services to one community, while another, similar community is receiving no services, it makes little sense for a second NGO to start providing the same services to the …rst community when it could have a greater impact on the welfare of the second.
To formalize this idea, let us suppose that NGOs face …xed transactions costs C within each of the locations they serve. Let us write the NGO's objective function as:
where M j denotes the level of public good provision already provided by other NGOs, and
is an indicator function that takes value 1 if M j > 0 -i.e., if there is an NGO intervening in community j -and 0 otherwise. We continue to assume that V 00 < 0, i.e., that there are decreasing returns to NGO intervention. This implies that the marginal bene…t from j's intervention falls with M j . Given that the transaction cost of intervention C is …xed, the 'bang-for-the-buck'is maximized if M j = 0. Other things being equal, each NGO will operate in a community where no other NGO intervenes to avoid diluting the welfare gain from its intervention.
From this simple observation, we obtain two testable predictions: (1) that there should be at most one NGO operating in each community; and (2) that the satisfaction that client community members derive from one NGO's intervention decreases with the number of NGOs operating in that community.
The …rst two lines or panels in Table 11 indicate that only just over 10 percent of the NGOs included in our study were the sole NGO operator in the client communities involved in their assessment and that there were, on average, 3.8 NGOs working in each of the client communities where assessments were undertaken. These …gures suggest that hypothesis (1) is not supported and that there is excessive geographical concentration of NGO activity in Ugandan. However, before accepting this as our conclusion we need to eliminate a number of alternative explanations.
First, geographical concentration might occur if many NGOs are too small to serve the needs of all the members of any particular community. Where one NGO is not su¢ cient, two or three may join forces to deliver an adequate level of service. From equation (5.1), we see that if the total resources M of an NGO are very limited, the presence of …xed transactions costs makes it optimal for the NGO to focus on a single location. Put di¤erently, it is wasteful for an NGO that is unable to ful…l the needs of one community to disperse its e¤orts across several. Only if M is large enough is it optimal for the NGO to operate in several locations and, under these circumstances, it will be the sole NGO operating in each. 11 It follows from this reasoning that, on average, NGOs operating in more than one community should be large and thus should be sole NGO operating in most of these communities. In contrast, NGOs operating in only one community should be small. Consequently, they are more likely to intervene in communities where other NGOs are also operating.
To test this conjecture, we divide our NGO sample into two groups: those that intervene alone and those that intervene in the same community as other NGOs. Sole NGO providers should, on average, operate in more districts than those that intervene with others. The result of this test is presented in the third panel of Table 11 . Contrary to expectations, NGOs that are sole providers tend to operate in fewer districts, although the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant.
Second, it may be that the specialized NGOs included in our sample, while in the minority, are confounding this analysis. Since specialization eliminates duplication of e¤ort, e¢ ciency need not be reduced when several specialized NGOs intervene in the same community. By the same reasoning, it may be e¢ cient for specialized NGOs to operate in several communities even though, in each of them, they are not sole NGO. This situation would arise if, in each village, they ful…ll the need in which they specialize.
This suggests a test as follows. Consider specialized and unspecialized NGOs. For unspecialized NGOs, our earlier conclusion still applies: we expect NGOs intervening in several communities to intervene alone, while those intervening in the same location as other NGOs should only intervene in one community. In contrast, for specialized NGOs nothing precludes them from intervening in multiple communities even if other NGOs also operate there. It follows that we can compare NGOs intervening in the same community as other NGOs: e¢ ciency requires that unspecialized NGOs do not operate in another community; e¢ ciency does not impose any such restriction on specialized NGOs.
A careful review of the descriptions that the NGOs gave of their own activities led us to conclude that around 18 percent can reasonably be characterized as specialists. As the …nal panel of Table 11 shows, such specialists are no less likely to be found among the sole NGO operators than among those who are not sole operators, and appear to be operating in fewer rather than more districts than unspecialized NGOs. The di¤erence is statistically signi…cant at the 10% level.
To summarize, the observed pattern of geographical NGO clustering cannot be explained either by NGO specialization or by di¤erence in NGO size. Such geographical clustering is thus unlikely to maximize e¢ ciency if community-speci…c transactions costs are present.
There remains the possibility that our assumption regarding transactions costs is incorrect.
It is conceivable that there are unobserved complementarities between NGO interventions. Such complementarities could arise, for instance, if NGOs pool resources so as to economize on transactions costs C -e.g., by sharing of sta¤ time and vehicles, sharing of organizational structures, joint meetings (Fafchamps and Owens 2005) . In the presence of such externalities, geographical clustering might be optimal.
To test this possibility, we note that in this case, our prediction (2) fails: with complementarities between NGOs, the satisfaction of client community members should increase with the number of NGOs operating in that community. To test this hypothesis, we augment the Tobit regressions presented in Table 9 with one additional right hand side variable, the number of other NGOs operating in the community that conducted the assessment. The results are presented in Table 12 . The new regressor bears a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient in the model for the full sample of client communities, while causing only marginal changes in the magnitude and signi…cance of the coe¢ cients on all the other variables of interest. This …nding fails to support the idea that NGO clustering is caused by complementarities; it rather supports our earlier hypothesis that clustering results in duplication of e¤ort.
Concluding Remarks
Employing original survey data gathered in Uganda, we have examined whether satisfaction with NGO activities varies systematically with remoteness and prosperity. To our knowledge, this is the …rst attempt to assess NGO client-community satisfaction and NGO motivations by applying statistical methods to data from a large representative survey.
Using a simple model of NGO service delivery, we argued that satisfaction with NGO intervention should be lower in prosperous communities if NGOs seek to equalize welfare across rich and poor communities. We also argued that higher delivery costs will cause NGOs to allocate fewer resources -and hence generate less satisfaction -in more remote communities.
Both model predictions are supported by our analysis of rural client-community satisfaction with NGOs. However, Kampala is di¤erent. Here, our basic model has no predictive power. This is probably because remoteness is less of an issue in the capital city, where all communities can be accessed with relative ease. There, residents in one neighborhood can access service providers located in others and the prosperity of any particular neighborhood is less important in determining the geographical distribution of NGO activity as a result.
We also investigate whether satisfaction with NGOs depends on whether the NGOs adopt a participatory approach. Our results suggest that this is indeed the case. Both a permanent NGO presence in the client-community and community involvement in NGO decision-making raise client community satisfaction. Further, it seems that some but not all of the relative dissatisfaction of remote communities with NGOs re ‡ects the tendency of NGOs to maintain permanent presences only in less remote and more prosperous communities, a …nding that is in line with that of (Sharma and Zeller 1999) regarding micro-credit in Bangladesh. It remains to be seen whether the positive relationship between participation and satisfaction is due to a direct e¤ect of participation on satisfaction, to a better resulting match between NGO activities and community needs, or to the payment of per diems to participating community members.
In the last section of our empirical analysis, we examined the e¤ects of geographical clustering in NGO interventions. Within the client communities included in this study there is considerable evidence of geographical concentration of NGO interventions. Combined analysis of the data provided by the client communities and the NGOs themselves indicated that the clustering is due neither to their small size nor to NGO specialization -which is largely lacking. Regression analysis further indicated that NGO clustering reduces client community satisfaction. Taken together, these results suggest that there is extensive duplication of NGO e¤ort at the local level.
The results presented here su¤er from a number of shortcomings. First, as we have already discussed, measurement problems preclude a combined analysis of client-community satisfaction with NGO outputs, inputs, and costs. Second and most importantly given our objective, our analysis is based on data collected only from communities in which NGOs are active. In Uganda there are likely to be a large number of communities that receive no services from NGOs. Given our …ndings that NGOs generate less satisfaction in more isolated communities, in part because they are less likely to maintain a permanent presence in such communities, it seems reasonable to surmise that the most isolated and needy communities in Uganda may be entirely beyond the reach of the nation's NGOs and hence excluded from our sample. This has implications for the way is which we should view our …nding that NGOs allocate their interventions so as to redress the welfare imbalance between rich and poor communities. Data of the kind employed by Fruttero and Gauri (2005) when working on Bangladesh is necessary to ascertain whether NGOs target or avoid the most needy communities in a country. Ideally one would combine both approaches, provided the necessary data are available. This is left for future research. 
